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Abstract
Firms have a choice: grow through internal investment, or grow through acquisition. While internal
growth takes time, an acquisition provides cash ￿ ows immediately, as the acquirer bene￿ts from the
investments of previous owners. The opportunity to grow internally a⁄ects the price of an acquisition as it
is a fall-back option for the acquirer should negotiations break down. Thus, internal growth opportunities
speed up acquisitions when integration costs are signi￿cant or synergies not too great. Because investors
do not have full information about the time a ￿rm requires to grow internally, acquirers earn positive
returns before announcement of an acquisition, and there are negative stock price reactions to acquisition
announcements for a wide range of parameter values. This research provides novel predictions about how
pre-announcement price run-up and negative announcement returns relate to high integration costs and
low synergies from acquisition, without requiring learning about these variables. The model also predicts
that buyer-initiated acquisitions result in more pronounced negative acquirer announcement returns than
seller-initiated acquisitions.
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Keywords: Corporate Investment, Acquisitions1 Introduction
When a ￿rm wants to expand, it needs additional assets. In the case of a geographic expansion,
this typically includes purchasing land, buildings, and machines, training new employees, and
building relationships with new customers. Such an expansion requires both a substantial ￿nancial
commitment and time for the investment to generate cash ￿ ows.
A ￿rm can also acquire additional assets by buying an established business, whether an entire
￿rm or a division of a ￿rm. This way the ￿rm can access a new market more quickly, as it will
bene￿t from the investments of the previous owners. For a pharmaceutical company to expand
into a new area of drug development, for example, it would take years of research before a new
product could be brought to market. Rather than make these internal investments itself, the
￿rm can acquire another ￿rm already operating in that area and take advantage of that ￿rm￿ s
accumulated knowledge.1
We analyze this fundamental trade-o⁄ between internal growth and growth via acquisition.
Internal growth and growth via acquisition are modelled as opportunities to acquire a cash ￿ ow
generating set of assets. If the ￿rm decides to grow internally, it must make two investments,
with some time between the two before realizing any bene￿ts. If the ￿rm makes an acquisition,
we assume instantaneous access to cash ￿ ows after paying integration costs.
Although these two alternatives for growth are normally mutually exclusive, there is an im-
portant connection between them. Before the ￿rm makes an acquisition, we assume that the
￿rm can always choose to grow internally, so internal investment is a fall-back strategy. Internal
1As an example, P. Hug of Roche is quoted saying, ￿If you can￿ t refuel with new innovative drugs [internally],
you go outside￿[Financial Times, May 27, 2005].
1growth thus in￿ uences both the decision to acquire and the acquisition price, given the value
of the alternative to invest internally, which we show is inversely related to the price paid in
the acquisition.2 Whenever an acquisition occurs at a value higher than the optimal threshold
value to invest internally, the acquirer can try to reduce the price paid by making the acquisi-
tion sooner. Earlier acquisition increases the value of the internal growth option, and thus the
buyer￿ s negotiating power. This strategic action can push the acquisition threshold below the
level that maximizes the social surplus obtained in the transaction. This happens when the costs
of integrating the acquired unit are high, or when there are relatively few synergies from the
acquisition. In this case, although there is no uncertainty about these parameters, if outside
investors are imperfectly informed about the pro￿tability of the internal investment, but might
infer it from the moment of the acquisition, then an acquisition generally sends a negative signal
that a⁄ects the stock price of the acquiring ￿rm.
An interest in preserving the value of the internal investment and using it wisely in negotiations
motivates the acquirer to approach the seller. For a wide range of parameter values, an acquirer-
initiated transaction results in a negative stock price reaction. For the remaining parameter
values, the negotiations are initiated either by the buyer or by the seller. In this case, the stock
price reaction is zero on average. That is, there are signi￿cantly di⁄erent announcement returns
whether the acquisition is initiated by the buyer or the seller.
The model also shows that the value of the acquirer increases for some time before an acqui-
sition is announced. This happens because the acquirer has the option to either implement the
internal growth strategy or the acquisition, and as time passes without announcement of an ac-
2The importance of pro￿table alternatives for acquisition strategy is noted by H. de Castries, CEO of Axa: ￿If
we do not want to become a prisoner to acquisitions, we need to have strong organic growth￿[Financial Times,
September 23, 2005].
2quisition, outside investors increase their estimate of the value of the internal growth opportunity.
The extent of the price run-up is negatively related to the acquirer￿ s announcement return.
We also ￿nd that acquisitions with low levels of synergies or relatively high integration costs
do not maximize the social surplus. This is because, in these cases, the value of the option to
grow internally deteriorates with time, and to prevent it from happening, the acquirer makes the
acquisition too early from an e¢ ciency standpoint. The result that an acquisition is not always
initiated at a level that maximizes the overall surplus to society is in contrast to Jovanovic and
Braguinsky (2004), who ￿nd that in a competitive industry mergers are not just privately, but
also socially e¢ cient. The social ine¢ ciency increases with the level of bargaining power of the
seller.
Wealth e⁄ects associated with the dynamics of the stock price in takeover contests have been
the subject of some discussion. Harford (1999) and Ang and Cheng (2003) ￿nd that the stock
of acquiring ￿rms performs well in the years before an acquisition. Schwert (2000) and Andrade,
Mitchell, and Sta⁄ord (2001) ￿nd a negative abnormal price reaction to the announcement of a
bid. Why then would ￿rms decide to proceed with an acquisition when in general the market
reacts negatively to such actions? Explanations have so far been con￿ned to agency con￿ icts,
errors of judgment, or simple market irrationality. For example, Roll (1986) argues that managers
of bidder ￿rms incorrectly assess the value of the combined ￿rms. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) claim
managers overinvest in assets that suit their skills in order to entrench themselves. Schleifer and
Vishny (2003) argue later that mergers occur when managers take advantage of the opportunities
created when ine¢ cient ￿nancial markets value some ￿rms incorrectly. Our model shows there
may be price run-ups before and price declines upon the announcement of an acquisition in
3rational markets in the absence of any agency con￿ icts.
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) also analyze the
trade-o⁄between internal investment and acquisitions. McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) model
a duopoly with one potential entrant. The entrant can achieve market entry either through
its separate entity, which increases the number of competitors, or through an acquisition. The
decision to enter via acquisition signals a high cost of entry, and may cause negative announcement
returns for the acquirer. In horizontal mergers, Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) show negative
announcement e⁄ects even when mergers are individually and socially e¢ cient.
Despite these contributions to our understanding of acquisition announcement e⁄ects, it is
di¢ cult to use a static approach to explain the dynamics of stock returns around the announce-
ment of acquisitions, for at least three reasons: (1) A static model does not allow for recognition
of important di⁄erences between internal and external investment, such as that internal growth
takes more time. We show that this feature has a profound e⁄ect on the timing of acquisitions
and on whether announcement returns are positive or negative.
(2) A static model forces any investment of the ￿rm to occur at one particular time. This
is typically not the optimal choice, which has important implications for learning by outside
investors. Even when investors anticipate an acquisition rather than internal growth, announce-
ment returns may be negative if the timing of the acquisition surprises investors. Identifying the
conditions under which this occurs allows us to derive a number of novel empirical predictions
about the e⁄ect of acquisition characteristics on announcement returns.
(3) A static model does not allow us to draw conclusions about stock market returns before or
after acquisitions. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our model is able to generate positive
4stock market returns for the acquirer before an acquisition is announced.
There is a growing literature that studies acquisition strategies in a dynamic context. Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) study a model of acquisitions that
assumes ￿nancial markets may misvalue both acquirer and target. They show that this can lead
to a correlation between merger activity and market valuation. Lambrecht (2004) shows that this
can also occur when mergers increase market power or are designed to generate economies of scale.
Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2005) note that mergers are a defensive instrument for managers trying
to avoid being taken over. Lambrecht and Myers (2005) show that takeovers are a more e¢ cient
mechanism for industry contraction than ￿rm or plant closures when managers￿interests con￿ ict
with shareholders interests. Hackbarth and Morellec (2007) study ￿rm risk before, around, and
after mergers.
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) examine the e⁄ect of multiple bidders and imperfect informa-
tion on takeover activity. When investors are uncertain about the synergies potential acquisitions
create, competition for targets may lead to negative price reactions upon acquisition announce-
ments. Our model complements this result. We show that competition is not necessary to generate
negative announcement returns and derive di⁄erent empirical predictions. Also, including the op-
portunity of internal investment demonstrates, in contrast to Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005), that acquisitions frequently take place earlier than socially optimal.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows Section 2 contains the model in which we
derive the acquisition price endogenously as the outcome of a bargaining game between acquirer
and seller when the acquirer initiates the negotiations. Section 3 analyzes the e⁄ect of the
characteristics of the opportunity to grow internally on the acquisition strategy. Section 4 shows
5that the model generates a price run-up of the acquirer￿ s stock prior to an acquisition and its
subsequent decline upon the announcement of the acquisition. Section 5 looks at the case when
either party can initiate the transaction. It shows that buyer-initiated transactions lead to more
signi￿cant announcement returns on average than seller-initiated transactions. Section 6 discusses
the model￿ s empirical implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Dynamic Model of Acquisitions
Suppose a risk-neutral ￿rm is planning to obtain a set of assets of value V .3 The value of the set
of assets follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dV
V
= (￿ ￿ ￿)dt + ￿dZ , (1)
where ￿ ￿ ￿ < r is the expected percentage change of V (￿ is the total expected rate of returns,
and ￿ is the payout rate to securityholders.); ￿ is the volatility rate, which is assumed to be
constant; and dZ is the increment of a standard Brownian motion. A risk-free rate is ￿xed at
the rate r. At the beginning, the ￿rm must choose between two mutually exclusive alternatives:
1) it can either obtain the set of assets by acquiring another business, or 2) assemble the set by
producing or purchasing the assets individually.
We assume throughout that the ￿rm is all-equity ￿nanced, and that its managers act in the
interest of equityholders who pay for the investment cost in both cases. Under these assumptions,
there are no agency con￿ icts.
3The set of assets may include a ￿xed component, K, and the total value of the set of assets is then K + V .
This does not change the results of our analysis. For simplicity, we ignore the ￿xed component in the model.
62.1 Acquisition
By acquiring another business, a ￿rm buys a set of assets already in place and already generating
cash ￿ ows. Buying assets as a package allows the ￿rm to produce cash ￿ ows sooner than it could
if it had to buy the assets separately. To capture the notion of quick cash ￿ ow generation, we
assume acquisition will give the ￿rm immediate access to the set of assets. Acquiring the assets
requires an investment of kA, which has two components: (1) a ￿xed deadweight cost, F > 0,
which represents the expenses of integrating the new business entity and is given exogenously in
the model,4 and (2) the acquisition price, pA, which is determined endogenously by bargaining
between the acquirer and the shareholders of the seller.5 The acquisition price is not constant
but depends on the value of the asset at the time of the acquisition. When acquisition timing is
￿ exible, real options theory asserts that it is not optimal to invest when the asset value is equal
to the investment amount, but rather when V is equal to some critical value that is higher than
the investment amount. We denote the critical value of the set of assets at which the acquisition
takes place as V A
G . V A￿
G indicates the optimal value of V A
G at which the value of the opportunity
to acquire is maximized. The value of the acquisition opportunity is denoted as vA(V ) and the
optimal vA(V ) as vA￿(V ).
The value of the opportunity to acquire at any value of V A














4The ￿xed cost, can be understood to encompass any loss incurred in liquidating expendable assets or any
negative impact on shareholder value caused by a greater volatility in the asset during the integration process.
5We use the more generic term seller rather than the target because we examine the acquisition of parts of ￿rms











and ￿ is a positive root of the quadratic equation 1
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can be interpreted as the risk-neutral probability that the current asset
value V will reach the level V A









implies lower pro￿ts from the acquisition. The derivation of (2)￿ (4) is standard
in the real options literature [see McDonald and Siegel (1984) and Dixit and Pindyck, Chapter 6
(1994)].
2.2 Endogenous Acquisition Price




is determined by bargaining between the acquirer and the share-
holders of the seller. We assume ￿rst that the acquiring ￿rm decides if and when to enter into
negotiations with the seller￿ s shareholders. It is typically bene￿cial for a bidder to hide its plans
as long as possible to reduce the risk of a preemptive competitive bid.6 The value V is not con-
tractible, for example, due to the lack of veri￿ability in court. Thus, it is impossible to negotiate
a transaction ex ante that is to be executed if V reaches a certain value in the future at speci￿ed
terms.
For simplicity, we assume that managers of the seller represent the interests of its shareholders,
6The seller may also initiate the negotiations. We analyze this case in Section 5.
8and all shareholders follow an agreement reached between the acquiring ￿rm and the seller￿ s
managers.7
Once the acquirer and the seller begin negotiations, their outcome is determined by both
parties￿outside options as well as the distribution of bargaining power. We treat the distribution
of bargaining power as exogenous here. The seller￿ s bargaining power is denoted by ￿ 2 [0;1].
We assume that acquisition negotiations are possible only once. If the parties do not agree on
the terms of the acquisition, resuming acquisition talks later is not possible.
The assumption of one-time negotiations is reasonable as frequently a considerable part of the
synergies between acquirer and acquiree arise due to the element of surprise associated with the
acquisition. For example, when negotiations or their failure become public, information is revealed
to competitors who may be able to take actions rendering a future acquisition unpro￿table (or less
pro￿table than an immediate agreement). The party bene￿ting from an early agreement has the
incentive to make such information publicly available as it causes a procrastinating strategy of the
other party to become suboptimal. Another way of eliminating future negotiations is to commit
to taking the alternative course of action should negotiations fail. For example, the acquirer can
either engage in contractual commitments that cause an internal strategy to be optimal upon
the failure of negotiations. Possibly more prevalent is the use of reputational capital vis a vis
employees, customers, suppliers or investors to ascertain that internal growth is bound to take
place should negotiations fail. For example in case of a geographic expansion, the acquirer may
publicly announce its entering of the new regional market, de facto, committing it to such a move
(either via acquisition or internal investment) is it to avoid the cost of losing reputational capital
7In the case of a takeover, one could also assume that the ￿rm negotiates with the shareholder whose vote
allows the acquirer to control the ￿rm and freeze out the non-tendering shareholders at the negotiated price. For
a description of freezeout laws and practices, see Amihud, Kahan, and Sundaram (2004).
9with various groups of stakeholders. Again, the party bene￿ting from an immediate agreement
relative to a later one has the incentive to pursue such activities.
Also, from the acquirer￿ s perspective, resuming negotiation at later dates creates signi￿cant
direct and indirect costs; the acquirer may have to change the agreement and pay additional fees
to the consulting ￿rms. Furthermore, acquisition activities usually takes considerable time and
e⁄ort from the managers and may keep them from performing their normal activities, and some
￿rms may intentionally postpone other investments until after the acquisition is completed. If
the negotiation is prolonged, the acquirer can incur signi￿cant opportunity costs.
The seller, on the other hand, may have an incentive to prolong the negotiation in order to
wait for other potential buyers. However, the possibility that a new buyer might not show up,
and the uncertainty about the synergies created from a new buyer make such a strategy risky.
Furthermore, the seller might have to pay a break-up fee should it decides to negotiate with a
new buyer.
As we will demonstrate below, the assumption that negotiations take place once combined
with the impossibility of striking a deal ex ante implies that a surplus-maximising outcome cannot
be guaranteed.





.Otherwise the deal falls through, and each party is left with its outside options.
If an acquisition creates surplus at the time that negotiations take place, the parties reach an




is assumed to be determined by the Nash bargaining solution. When









, the equilibrium acquisition price is given by
pA(V A
G ) = dS(V A
G ) + ￿[V A
G ￿ F ￿ dA(V A
G ) ￿ dS(V A
G )] . (5)
2.3 Outside Option of the Seller
To analyze the optimal acquisition threshold, the values of the parties￿outside options need to be
characterized. When the set of assets is not sold to the acquirer, it is employed in the next best
alternative, and its value is assumed to be aV , where a 2 (0;1). This assumes that the assets of
the seller when combined with those of the buyer increase in value by (1 ￿ a)V over the next-best
alternative. At the time of the negotiations, the seller￿ s outside option is dS = aV A
G . The seller￿ s
expected wealth for V < V A
G , s(V ), is given by















where aV represents the value of the set of assets when it is used in the next-best alternative,
while the second term can be interpreted as an option to acquire the assets aV A





if the value reaches V A






can be interpreted as the (discounted) risk-
neutral probability that V A
G is reached. It is clear from this equation that the seller￿ s strategy is





G . See the appendix for the derivation
of Equation (6).
112.4 Internal Growth as the Outside Option of the Acquirer
If the acquiring ￿rm and the seller do not reach an agreement, the acquirer has the opportunity to
assemble the assets required to grow through individual investments. This opportunity to grow
internally is itself an option, assuming the acquirer has the ￿ exibility to decide if and when to
make the investment. We assume that acquiring and growing internally are mutually exclusive
strategies. This means that even if the inferior alternative has a lower optimal starting threshold,
it will not be implemented. More speci￿cally, the ￿rm does not start to grow internally and
later acquires, and vice versa. Then, the value of the option to grow internally at the time of
negotiations represents the acquirer￿ s outside option in the bargaining game.
For comparability, we assume the value of the set of assets when growing internally is identical
to the value in the case of an acquisition. We denote the value of the option to grow internally
by vO(V ). When the ￿rm decides to invest internally, it needs to assemble the set of assets by
itself. This takes time. Thus, it cannot obtain immediate access to the cash ￿ ow of the complete
set of assets.
We assume the ￿rm￿ s investment takes place in two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the ￿rm can
obtain a portion ￿ 2 (0;1) of the set of assets. The ￿rst-stage investment is assumed to be
proportional to the total investment, i.e., the ￿rst-stage investment is ￿kO, where kO is the total
investment in internal growth. We denote any arbitrarily chosen level of the asset value that the
￿rm executes in the ￿rst-stage investment as V O
G . When V O
G is chosen optimally to maximize the
value of internal growth, we denote it by V O￿
G . The optimal value of vO(V ) is denoted by vO￿(V ).
A ￿rst-stage investment allows the ￿rm to proceed to the second investment stage. In the
second stage, the ￿rm obtains the remainder of the asset, 1￿￿, for an investment of (1￿￿)kO. To
12represent that internal growth is slower than growth via acquisition, we assume the asset value
has to increase to ￿V O￿
G , with ￿ > 1, before the second-stage investment can be made. That
is, some time has to elapse between the ￿rst and the second investment stage.8 Because V is
stochastic, the shortest time between the two investments, T, is a random variable ￿a stopping
time for the geometric Brownian motion. The expected length of the delay, T, provided that
(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2




(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2
2
ln(￿). (7)
Note that the distribution of T is independent of the ￿rst-stage investment threshold, V O
G ,
which implies that E[TjV O
G ] is also una⁄ected by V O
G . An increase in ￿ implies a longer expected
time delay. Also, notice that in calculating E[TjV O
G ], we use a real instead of a risk-neutral
measure in order to obtain the expected time delay in actual calender time, since it is more
instructive and easier to interpret. For example for (￿ ￿ ￿) = 0:2, ￿ = 0:10, and ￿ = 1:5, 2:07
years is anticipated to complete the internal growth. To calculate the expected time delay using a
risk-neutral measure, replace (￿￿￿) with (r￿￿). Naturally, the latter is longer than the former.
The maximum value of the option to grow internally, vO￿(V ), is given in Lemma 1:


























for V ￿ V O￿
G
,
8Alternative ways to model the time between initial investment and access to cash ￿ ows include assuming a
limited investment rate (see Majd and Pindyck, 1987, Milne and Whalley, 2000, 2001) or an exogenously speci￿ed
time lag between an initial and a ￿nal investment (see Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996). One di¢ culty with such time-
to-build or gestation period models is that no closed-form solutions are available. Numerical analysis indicates,
however, that the main results are not a⁄ected if one of these alternative models is chosen.





￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
kO, (8)
The optimal second-stage investment threshold is ￿V O￿
G for V ￿ V O￿
G and ￿V for V > V O￿
G .
When V is lower than V O￿
G , the value of internal growth opportunity is the sum of the







, and the second-stage







, where ￿(V O￿
G ￿ kO) and (1 ￿ ￿)(￿V O￿
G ￿ kO) are the













risk-neutral probabilities that V will reach the investment threshold in each stage. When V is
greater than V O￿
G , the option to grow internally is exercised immediately, so V O￿










































for V ￿ V O￿
G , a standard result for a real option threshold and
valuation, as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
The second-stage delay parameter ￿ plays an important role in determining V O￿
G and vO￿(V ).
We can characterize the e⁄ect of a change in the value of ￿ on these variables:
Corollary 1 There is a unique ￿￿ so that for values of ￿ < ￿￿, V O￿
G declines with ￿, and for
￿ > ￿￿, V O￿
G increases with ￿.
The value of the opportunity to grow internally, vO￿(V ), declines with ￿.
14Proof. See Appendix.
First, consider the relation between ￿ and V O￿
G . An increase in ￿ reduces the value of internal
growth by making less likely that the second stage of the investment will be executed. The
￿rm can improve the probability by reducing the level of V O￿
G . The higher ￿ is, the more the
￿rm reduces V O￿
G to protect the value of its subsequent investment. But if ￿ is very high, the
probability of the second investment is so low that to increase it requires reducing V O￿
G so much
that the value of the ￿rst investment is signi￿cantly reduced. In this case, V O￿
G increases as
￿ increases.
The relation between ￿ and vO￿(V ), however, is monotonic. Recall that the higher ￿ is, the
longer the ￿rm needs to wait to proceed with the second stage on average (however the ￿rm
chooses V O￿
G ). Therefore, vO￿(V ) declines with ￿. In the worst case scenario when ￿ ! 1, the








, the value of the ￿rst-stage investment.
2.5 Equilibrium
In the equilibrium in which the ￿rm chooses to grow by acquisition, even though internal invest-
ment does not occur, its value and the exercise strategies for both the ￿rst- and second-stage
investment are linked to the price that the acquirer pays for the set of assets, because internal
investment is a fall-back option if the negotiation does not go through. Given the analytical
solution for the value of internal growth in Lemma 1, the equilibrium outcome of the acquisition





G , is stated in Proposition 1:





G are divided into two regimes accord-


















































































￿(￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO + (1 ￿ ￿)F
￿(￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)
. (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the early acquisition regime, the ratio of ￿xed integration cost, F, to the proportion of value
added by the acquisition, 1 ￿ a, is relatively low. In this case, the acquisition threshold, V A￿
G , is
lower than the optimal threshold for internal investment, V O￿





a function of ￿, V A￿
G is not. To understand this, recall that the ￿xed cost the acquirer has to pay
under an acquisition agreement plays an important role for the threshold. This is a deadweight
cost for the acquirer, that makes the acquisition less pro￿table. Thus, the ￿rm is willing to wait
16for the optimal level of V to acquire the assets.
In the second regime, which we refer to as late acquisition, and which occurs for su¢ ciently
high F
1￿a, the ￿rm acquires the assets at above the optimal threshold for investing internally, i.e.,
V A￿
G > V O￿
G . This means that the value of the ￿rm￿ s outside option is not at the maximum when
the ￿rm acquires the assets. Acquiring the assets late reduces the value of the acquirer￿ s option to
grow internally, but the relatively high cost of integrating the acquired assets renders it optimal
to grow internally.
2.6 Acquisition as the Optimal Investment Strategy
Even though the value increase from an acquisition, (1￿a)V , is positive, an acquisition does not
always occur in the equilibrium because internal growth may be more valuable than an acquisition.
A condition for an acquisition to be the optimal growth strategy is given in Proposition 2:





, it is optimal for the
￿rm to acquire the assets rather than to grow internally. A increases with F, and if F is not too
large, A declines with ￿, and increases with ￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
The decision to make an acquisition depends critically on the value created by these assets,
(1 ￿ a)V . A is the cut-o⁄ point above which the ￿rm pursues an acquisition. Above this level,
the pro￿ts from an acquisition are large enough for the acquirer to prefer to deal with the seller.
Proposition 2 also shows that the cuto⁄point declines with the time necessary to complete the
internal expansion, ￿, because the higher the ￿, the less attractive the internal growth. However,
17when the integration costs, F, increase, the acquisition is less pro￿table; therefore, the cuto⁄
point increases.
Less obvious is the e⁄ect of the uncertainty of the underlying assets, ￿, on the cuto⁄ level.
Because both the internal growth and the acquisition are real options, an increase in the uncer-
tainty of the underlying asset increases the value of both options. However, the increase in the
value of the internal growth is higher than the increase in the value of the acquisition. To see
this, recall that for the internal growth, ￿ is a constraint on the second stage investment, i.e.,
the second investment will not occur until V reaches ￿V O￿
G . The increase in the volatility of
the underlying assets increases the probability that ￿V O￿
G will be reached, and thus helps reduce
the adverse e⁄ect of ￿ on the value of the internal growth, so internal growth becomes a more
attractive strategy, and, therefore, the cuto⁄ level increases with ￿.
As we are interested in ￿rms￿acquisition strategies, we focus henceforth on parameters for
which an acquisition is the optimal investment strategy.
2.7 Acquisition Strategy: Individual vs. Social E¢ ciency
The social optimum is reached if the outcome of the negotiations is independent of strategic
considerations. This takes place when the buyer has full bargaining power, ￿ = 0. In this case,






1￿a. As the acquirer does not invest internally, the internal project￿ s characteristics
do not enter the socially e¢ cient threshold.
In the early acquisition regime, the individually and socially e¢ cient thresholds coincide for
any distribution of bargaining power, ￿ 2 [0;1]. In the late acquisition regime, the acquisition





￿(￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿))+(1￿￿)(1￿a). As V A￿
G =@￿ < 0 (for a proof see Appendix), the
individually optimal threshold is below the socially optimal threshold for ￿ 2 (0;1]. The inability
to reach the surplus-maximizing outcome results from the assumptions that an acquisition cannot
be agreed upon ex ante and that negotiations take place only once. The acquirer￿ s outside option
deteriorates as the value of the assets moves away from the exercise threshold for internal growth,
V O￿
G . This strategic element cannot be avoided given the above mentioned assumptions. If, for
example, multiple negotiations were allowed, this e⁄ect could be eliminated. The ine¢ ciency
increases as the seller has more bargaining power.
As a result, policies that limit the bargaining power of the seller may be bene￿cial to the
society since they allow the buyer to choose the socially optimal timing of the acquisition. For
example, a takeover defense mechanism like a poison pill, which gives the board of directors of
the target ￿rm ￿ exibility to negotiate a better deal with the acquirer, may force the acquirer
to start the acquisition too early in order to protect the value of its outside option, and, hence,
destroy part of the social surplus. From this point of view, policies that curb the use of poison
pills may yield more socially e¢ cient outcomes.
Furthermore, acquirer￿ s strategies that can align the interest of the acquirer and the seller
such as a toehold may also bring about a more socially e¢ cient outcome. For example, when the
acquirer possesses a toehold, it will start the acquisition later than it otherwise would in order
to increase the value of its stake in the target ￿rm. Therefore, the acquisition will take place
closer to a socially optimum threshold. A thorough analysis of the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies
or acquisition strategies on the social surplus is an interesting avenue for future research both
theoretically and empirically.
19The optimal acquisition threshold for di⁄erent distributions of bargaining power is displayed
in Figure I, and the base case parameters are identi￿ed in Table I. The socially e¢ cient acquisition
threshold is V A￿
G = 2:815, which takes place when ￿ is equal to 0. For ￿ > 0, the acquisition is
initiated earlier, and when ￿ = 1, it occurs at the internal investment threshold, V O
G . The value
of the acquisition for the acquirer, vA￿(V ), declines with ￿.
The result that the acquisition may not be initiated at the level that maximizes the overall
surplus contrasts with the result in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), who obtain a socially e¢ cient
outcome in the case of a single bidder.
3 Pro￿tability of Internal Growth and Acquisition Strategy
The equilibrium V A￿
G and vA￿(V ) change with the main parameters that characterize internal
growth. Proposition 3 summarizes the e⁄ects of changes of ￿ on V A￿
G and vA￿(V ) for any exoge-
nous value of ￿:
Proposition 3 In the case of an early acquisition, ￿ does not a⁄ect V A￿
G .
In the case of a late acquisition and for any value of 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, there is a unique ￿￿ so that
for ￿ < ￿￿, V A￿
G declines with ￿, and for ￿ > ￿￿, V A￿
G increases with ￿:
In both cases, the value of the opportunity to acquire, vA￿(V ), declines with ￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that vA￿(V ) declines with ￿ in the late acquisition case is straightforward. As internal
growth is the acquirer￿ s outside option, when it is less valuable, so is the acquisition. How much
20the acquisition￿ s value is reduced depends on the bargaining power of the acquirer. If the seller
has all the bargaining power, the values of both the acquisition and the internal growth decline
by the same amount.
Next, consider the relation between ￿ and V A￿
G . Recall from Corollary 1 that for ￿ < ￿￿, the
higher the ￿, the lower the V O￿
G , and that the opposite holds for ￿ > ￿￿. The relation between
￿ and V A￿
G is similar, but the amount of change in V A￿
G depends on the bargaining power. If
the seller has all the bargaining power, then V A￿
G = V O￿
G ; and the change in V A￿
G is equal to the
change in V O￿
G .
Figure II shows how equilibrium pA(V A￿
G ) and V A￿
G vary with ￿, and how the acquisition value
and the seller￿ s wealth are a⁄ected by ￿ under the parameters set forth in Table I.
In Panel A, V A￿
G declines with ￿ until ￿ = 4:24, and then increases slightly thereafter. Panel
B shows that pA(V A￿
G ) under the current parameter con￿guration increases with ￿. The higher ￿
is, the less valuable internal growth is, and the higher the price the seller can charge the acquirer.
This makes the seller￿ s wealth increase and the acquisition value decline with ￿ as shown in Panel
C.
4 Imperfect Information about the Acquirer￿ s Outside Option
We would like to provide an explanation for observed price patterns before and around acquisition
announcements. To do this, we assume investors have imperfect information about the expected
time to complete the internal investment, ￿. If the managers of the acquiring ￿rm observe the true
value of ￿, but either cannot communicate or choose not to communicate it to outside investors,
21the acquisition announcement may resolve this uncertainty for investors.9
We examine the learning e⁄ect of the acquisition announcement, assuming ￿ = 1. A di⁄erent
distribution of bargaining power does not a⁄ect the direction of the results. Managers of the
acquirer are assumed to maximize the intrinsic value of the ￿rm, which rules out preferential
treatment of current shareholders over future shareholders. Also, we assume that the seller
learns the true value of ￿ during the course of the negotiations.10
Investors￿prior distribution of ￿ at time t = 0 is denoted by F (￿) with density f(￿). F (￿)








, an acquisition creates a positive
surplus. Assume for the moment that ￿ ￿ 1 and ￿ ￿ ￿￿. The information set of outside investors
at time t is zt, which includes the history of V from time t = 0 to time t and the value of
V = V A￿
G at which the ￿rm acquires the target.
4.1 The E⁄ect of an Acquisition Announcement on the Stock Price
Let b vA
t be the outside investors￿expected value at time t of the acquiring ￿rm. Then:
b vA
t = E[vA￿(V )jzt] , (13)
where for notational convenience we suppress the dependence of vA￿(V ) on V A￿
G ,where V A￿
G is in
turn a function of ￿. If we denotethe information set that includes everything up to time t but
9That option exercise can convey information is explicitly analyzed in Grenadier (1999), Lambrecht and Per-
raudin (2003), Carlson, Fischer, and Giammarino (2005), and Morellec and Zhdanov (2004).
10While we treat the distribution of bargaining power as exogenous, certain di⁄erences in bargaining power
appear to be more common than others. Bargaining power in negotiations is determined by the patience of the
bargaining parties (see, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Chapters 3 and 4). While the seller can
operate e¢ ciently during negotiations, the acquiring ￿rm typically must commit resources to organize the planned
integration and may thus forgo other opportunities if negotiations take too long. It is then natural to assume that
the acquiring ￿rm is less patient than the seller and therefore has less bargaining power. Also, if the ownership of
the seller is dispersed, the free-rider problem makes the seller￿ s owners more patient (Grossman and Hart, 1980).




t = E[vA￿(V )jz
0
t] (14)
is the expectation of vA￿(V )when investors do not observe V A￿
G (￿), but observe the development
of V .
We de￿ne the announcement e⁄ect as a change in the value of the acquisition at the time of
its announcement, ￿, as:
￿A
￿ = b vA
￿ ￿ b vA0
￿ . (15)
Even if investors observe the announcement of an acquisition, they can only draw infer-
ences about the realization of ￿, ￿#, when V A￿









1￿a. In this case, investors are able to perfectly anticipate
the acquisition threshold, as V A￿
G is independent of ￿, and no information is transmitted by the
acquisition announcement. Therefore, the posterior density ft(￿) at any time t > 0 is the same
as the prior, i.e., ft(￿) = f(￿). b vA
t is in this case an unconditional expectation of vA￿(V ):
b vA
t = E[vA￿(V )] , (16)










G varies with ￿. For the assumed support, the function
V A￿
G (￿) declines monotonically with ￿. Thus, any value of V A￿
G corresponds to a unique value of
￿, implying that outside investors can estimate the realized value of ￿ perfectly upon observing
23V A￿
G in the form of an acquisition announcement.
Before the acquisition, investors revise their beliefs regarding the realization of ￿. If no
acquisition is announced, investors know the acquisition threshold must be higher than the highest
value of V up to that time, V A￿
G > V mt = sup
s<t
Vt. Thus, every time V reaches a new peak,
information is conveyed. Since from Proposition 3 for ￿ < ￿￿, V A￿
G (￿) declines with ￿, there is
an inverse function G￿1 such that G￿1[V A￿
G (￿)] = ￿#. Because of the inverse relation between
V A￿
G and ￿#, @G￿1
@￿# < 0. As the acquisition has not occurred yet, the true value of ￿ must be
lower than G￿1(V mt). Given this information, investors update their beliefs by conditioning that
￿ < G￿1(V mt), so the posterior density at any time t < ￿, ft(￿), is:





For t ￿ ￿,investors observe V A￿
G (￿) and therefore infer the true value of ￿ perfectly. Thus,







G (￿) > V mt];
vA￿(V )
when t 2 [0;￿)
when t 2 [￿;1)
, (18)
calculated using the posterior density at time t, and vA￿(V ) at t ￿ ￿ is the value of vA￿(V )
evaluated at ￿#. Proposition 4 summarizes the e⁄ect of an acquisition announcement on the
acquisition value:
Proposition 4 If the seller has all the bargaining power, and internal growth is not expected to























￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, the acquisition occurs at a relatively low threshold, and V A￿
G <
V O￿
G . In this case, the acquisition threshold does not depend on ￿, and the acquisition itself does
not convey any information about it. Only the price of the acquisition reveals ￿#. If expectations









kO, and V reaches a new peak without there being an acquisition,
investors conclude that the value of ￿ that corresponds to the current V as the acquisition
threshold is not ￿#. This is the highest possible value of ￿ in the distribution. There is still
uncertainty about the lower values of ￿. Consequently, investors update their distribution of ￿ by
lowering its upper bound, which reduces the expected ￿. The acquisition announcement resolves
any uncertainty about these possible lower values and reveals ￿#. Therefore, ￿# is always higher
than the expected ￿ and b vA0
￿ > b vA
￿ . The acquisition announcement is bad news for the investor,
and the model generates negative announcement returns of acquisitions. Other studies that
report negative announcement e⁄ects are McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and Jovanovic and
Braguinsky (2004); however their results are based on uncertainty about whether an acquisition
will occur, rather than when an acquisition takes place. The results are also consistent with
empirical evidence (see Schwert, 2000, and Andrade, Mitchell and Sta⁄ord, 2001).11
11The ￿nancial press appears to believe that negative announcement returns are not always an indicator of
overpayment. For example, an article on Procter & Gamble￿ s acquisition of Gillette reads: ￿In midday trading
yesterday, P&G shares were trading at $53.87, down 2.6 per cent. To many in the mergers and acquisitions world,
such a small drop in the acquirer￿ s share price ... amounted to Wall Street￿ s endorsement of the structure of the
deal￿[Financial Times, January 29 and 30, 2005].
25These results hold when the expected second-stage delay, ￿, is not too long, ￿ < ￿￿. When
there is a long delay, ￿ > ￿￿, the results are reversed. In this case, an acquisition is good news,
as an increase in ￿ implies a higher acquisition threshold. Longer inactivity by the acquirer is
interpreted as a negative signal as to the prospects of internal growth and has a negative impact
on its stock price.
When ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, the function V A￿
G (￿) does not monotonically decline with ￿. As Proposition
3 indicates, V A￿
G (￿) declines with ￿ for ￿ < ￿￿, and increases with ￿ for ￿ ￿ ￿￿. In this case,
investors may not always perfectly anticipate ￿# from the announcement of the acquisition,
and the e⁄ect of the acquisition announcement is dependent on the prior distribution of ￿:12
However, for reasonable parameter values, the upper bound of ￿ is likely to be lower than ￿￿,
i.e., for (￿ ￿ ￿) = 0:2, ￿ = 0:10, if ￿ = ￿￿ = 4:24, it will take on average as long as 7:1 years to
complete the internal growth, so it is not unreasonable to assume that ￿ < ￿￿ = 4:24:
4.2 Discussion: Robustness of the Results
The acquirer bene￿ts from a large outside option at the time of the acquisition, which in￿ uences
the optimal acquisition threshold. The outside option takes the form of the value of the acquirer￿ s
internal investment opportunity. Thus, as the optimal threshold varies as a function of a change
in one of its characteristics, the optimal acquisition threshold either remains constant (early
acquisition) or moves in the same direction (late acquisition). The critical property that drives
12If ￿ is not too high, i.e., V
A￿
G (￿) > V
A￿
G (￿), even though ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿, there always exists b ￿ such that
V
A￿
G (b ￿) = V
A￿
G (￿) and b ￿ < ￿, and for any ￿
# 2 [￿; b ￿), ￿
A
￿ < 0. This means that if the upper bound of the
distribution of ￿ is not too high, even when V
A￿
G (￿) does not monotonically decline with ￿ for all the values of ￿ in
the support of the distribution, there still exists a range of ￿ such that V
A￿
G (￿) monotonically declines with ￿ and
the investors can perfectly anticipate ￿
#. In this range, the negative announcement e⁄ect still occurs independent
of the distribution of ￿. Also, note that in the special case in which ￿ = 0, i.e., the value of the internal growth
derives only from the second stage investment, V
A￿
G (￿) strictly declines with ￿, and the negative announcement
e⁄ect occurs regardless of the upper bound and the distribution of ￿.
26negative announcement returns in the model is that the optimal threshold for investing internally
rises with the pro￿tability of the investment. In other words, the acquirer can wait longer to
acquire, because internal investment is more pro￿table. As long as this property is preserved,
alternative model formulations yield the same result.
One example of an alternative formulation is that the pro￿tability of investing internally is
characterized not by a given time-to-build but by a probability that the investment will evaporate
at any given time. Then, a more pro￿table internal investment is one that has a lower probability
of disappearing.13 In this case, a ￿rm with a more pro￿table investment has a higher optimal
investment threshold, as the probability of losing the investment is relatively low. Such a model
features a positive relation between pro￿tability and investment threshold, and can be used to
explain negative announcement returns.
Under our framework, the model generates negative stock price reactions to acquisition an-
nouncements in the late acquisition regime and negligible expected returns otherwise, not just
when investors are uncertain about the expected time to complete the internal investment, but
also when they are uncertain about the distribution of bargaining power between buyer and
seller. As the seller has greater bargaining power, ￿, it becomes more important for the acquirer
to initiate the acquisition when its outside option is more valuable. As a consequence, the op-
timal acquisition threshold declines monotonically with ￿. When investors update their beliefs
regarding the distribution of bargaining power rationally as described above, announcement of an
acquisition is negative news, because it reveals that the acquirer has less than expected bargaining
power.
13Such a model is analyzed in McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005).
274.3 Stock Performance Prior to the Acquisition Announcement
The updating of ￿ also creates a steeper price run-up in the value of an acquisition than in the
case of no learning by investors. The price run-up in the value of the acquirer occurs for two
reasons. First, in order for an acquisition to occur, V must move up and reach the acquisition
threshold. Second, as V approaches the threshold, it reaches new peaks, and investors revise their
beliefs and raise their expectation of the pro￿tability of internal investment.
To see the e⁄ect of the updating before the announcement consider two times, t1 < t2 < ￿,
when the sets of assets are equally valuable. De￿ne the change in the expected value of the
acquisition from the perspective of outside investors from time t1 to t2 as:
￿A
t1;t2 = b vA
t2 ￿ b vA
t1 . (19)
Proposition 5 characterizes ￿A
t1;t2 before the time of the announcement:
Proposition 5 Suppose the seller has all the bargaining power, and it is not expected to take too
long to complete internal growth, ￿ ￿ ￿￿. If at two times, t1 and t2, the value of the assets, V , is
the same, then for t1 < t2 < ￿, ￿A




Without any revision in expectation, we would have ￿A
t1;t2 = 0; because the assets have the
same value at both dates. Investors update their expectation of ￿ as time passes. As V reaches
a new peak between time t1 and t2, investors form a posterior distribution by eliminating the
28highest ￿ thought possible before the peak was reached. Thus, for any t2 > t1; E[￿] at t2 ￿ E[￿]
at t1, and b vA
t2 ￿ b vA
t1. If between t1 and t2, V reaches a new high (V mt1 < V mt2), values are strictly
unequal, as investors are revising the distribution of ￿. In this sense, the model generates greater
positive changes in the acquisition value than the changes generated by the evolution of the value
of the underlying asset alone.
4.4 Numerical Example
A numerical example demonstrates how investors update their beliefs about ￿, and how the
announcement e⁄ect is generated. We assume that ￿# = 1:5, and investors￿prior distribution
of ￿ is uniform over 1 and 4 < ￿￿. The other parameters are as identi￿ed in Table I. Given the
parameters, the time lag between the ￿rst and second investment will take on average 2:07 years.
Figure III shows the development of V , V mt, E[￿], and b vA
t before and after the announcement.
Panel A shows the evolutions of V (solid line) and V mt (dashed line). At time t = 0,V is
equal to 2:50. It reaches the acquisition threshold at time ￿ = 50 at V A￿
G (￿) = 2:67. Recall that
by de￿nition V A￿
G (￿) = V m￿; that is, the acquisition threshold is the highest value of V up to
time ￿.
The corresponding expected ￿ is shown in Panel B. An unconditional expectation of ￿ is
equal to 2:5 (1
2 (1 + 4)). At t = 0, no announcement has occurred, so investors deduce that
V A￿
G (￿) > 2:5, and ￿ < 1:67. This leads them to form an expectation of ￿ that is equal to 1:33
(1
2 (1 + 1:67))
As V reaches higher values, investors start revising their expectation of ￿. For example, at
t = 20, V reaches 2:6, and no announcement has occurred, so investors deduce that V A￿
G (￿) > 2:6,
29and ￿ < 1:65. This leads them to form an expectation of ￿ that is equal to 1:325 (1
2 (1 + 1:65)).
Between t = 20 and t = 42, V does not reach any new peak, so there is no revision of the expected
value of ￿ in this period.
At ￿ = 50, the acquisition is announced, and investors learn that V A￿
G (￿) = 2:67, and conclude
that ￿# = 1:5. Therefore, there is a positive jump in the value of expected ￿ at this point.
This jump corresponds to a decline at time ￿ = 50 in the expected value of the acquisition, b vA
t ,
represented by a solid line in Panel C. For comparison, we also include in Panel C the acquisition
value if ￿ is known from time t = 0 (represented by the dashed line). Notice that as t approaches
￿ = 50, the investors￿expectation of ￿ is lower than ￿#, therefore the expected acquisition value
is higher than the true value. At ￿, uncertainty about ￿ is resolved, and the lines follow identical
paths from this time forward.
This e⁄ect can be clearly seen in Panel D, which plots the di⁄erence between the expected
acquisition value and the acquisition value if ￿ is known. Before the acquisition, because investors
revise their expectation of ￿, there is a greater di⁄erence as V reaches new peaks. When there
is no learning about ￿, the di⁄erence may grow or shrink with V . Overall, these changes are
dominated by the e⁄ect of the learning about ￿. Thus, there is a greater di⁄erence between the
expected acquisition value and the acquisition over time before the acquisition and the di⁄erence
disappears when the acquisition is announced.
4.5 Extension: Either Party Can Initiate the Transaction
So far, we have assumed that the buyer initiates the negotiations. Extending the analysis to allow
for the initiation of negotiations by either party both provides a robustness check of the results
30and yields insights about which transactions are initiated by sellers and which by buyers.
We maintain the assumption that negotiations take place only once. If negotiations fail, each
party is left with its outside options.













In the early acquisition regimes, the seller does not bene￿t from waiting beyond the surplus
maximizing value, so V S￿





1￿a: This is because the integration cost, F, is small. If
the synergy created by acquisition is su¢ ciently large, the seller￿ s surplus declines signi￿cantly if
it waits beyond V A￿
G . Although, the acquisition price for the seller improves slightly if it waits
beyond V O￿
G because the value of the buyer￿ s internal growth option starts to deteriorate, the
increase is not enough to compensate for the decline in the seller￿ s surplus.
In the late acquisition regime, the seller￿ s optimal threshold, V S￿
G , is at least as high as the





1￿a. This occurs because a higher threshold
implies a less valuable option for the buyer, and, consequently, a higher acquisition price for the
seller, and in this case F is relatively large; therefore, the loss in the seller￿ s share of social surplus
is small compared to the increase in price for the seller.
Lemma 2 is an important ingredient in establishing the identity of the party that initiates
negotiations. The proposition is:
Proposition 6 If the buyer and the seller can initiate the acquisition negotiations, in the early
acquisition regime, the negotiations may be initiated by either the buyer or the seller. In the late
31acquisition regime, the negotiations are always initiated by the buyer.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the early acquisition regime, the surplus maximizing threshold lies above the optimal
threshold for starting the internal investment. As in this case, a marginal increase in the threshold
does not a⁄ect the buyer￿ s outside option, and, similar to Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005), the seller does not have the incentive to delay the negotiation beyond the socially




1￿a; and it is indeterminate
who initiates the negotiations.
In the late acquisition regime, the buyer￿ s optimal threshold is below the surplus maximizing
level. Then, the seller never ￿nds it optimal to preempt the buyer￿ s initiation of the negotiations,
since its utility increases in the acquisition threshold. So the buyer initiates the negotiation
at V A￿
G < V S￿
G . Although, the seller can get a higher utility if it can delay the negotiation,
anticipating that the negotiation will take place only once, it will rationally accept the initial
o⁄er. This result is identical to the equilibrium outcomes in Section 2. Notice that unlike the
results in Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), negotiation occurs before a socially
e¢ cient threshold because of the internal growth alternative.
5 Empirical and Policy Implications
Our model supports a number of empirical and policy implications. As it relates acquisition
decisions to the characteristics of internal investment opportunities, it is most useful for situations
in which internal investment is a realistic alternative to an acquisition. It should also be noted
32that the following implications does not rely on any agency consideration.
Acquisition initiation
The model demonstrates that the decision to initiate acquisition negotiations is made strategi-
cally by the acquirer and the seller. While acquisition thresholds are identical for both parties at
ratios of integration cost to synergy, F
1￿a, below a certain level, above this level the seller chooses
a higher valuation than the buyer. Thus, transactions with high F
1￿a will be initiated by buyers,
while those with a low F
1￿a may be initiated by either the buyer or the seller.
Acquirer announcement returns, integration costs, and synergies
Announcement returns for the acquirer depend critically on the relative integration cost and
proportional value added. For low values of F
1￿a announcement returns are zero, and for high
values announcement returns are in general negative. Thus, acquisitions providing fewer synergies
relative to integration costs are predicted to result in lower acquirer announcement returns.
Our model is the ￿rst to predict a relation between announcement returns and the levels
of integration cost and the synergies from an acquisition, without requiring learning about these
variables. Our result is driven by investor uncertainty about either the pro￿tability of the internal
growth alternative or the relative bargaining power of the players. Contrary to results in Morellec
and Zhdanov (2005), our result does not depend on competition among di⁄erent bidders.
Stock price e⁄ects of announcements are predicted even though investors correctly anticipate
that the ￿rm chooses an acquisition as its method to grow. This ￿nding complements the results in
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) and in Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004), who report negative
announcement e⁄ects based on uncertainty about whether an acquisition will occur, rather than
when an acquisition takes place.
33Acquisition initiation and acquirer announcement returns
As acquisitions with high F
1￿a are initiated by the acquirer, acquirer-initiated transactions are
predicted to generate negative announcement e⁄ects on average, while returns in seller-initiated
transactions are expected to be negligible.
Pre-announcement run-up
In our model, the price run-up before the acquisition occurs because of imperfect information
regarding the value of the option to grow, and is consistent with the empirical evidence in Harford
(1999) and in Ang and Cheng (2006). In a cross section analysis, our model predicts greater stock
price run-up when F
1￿a is higher, because of positive updating of the acquirer￿ s internal investment
pro￿tability in these cases. As a relatively high integration cost-to-synergy ratio implies negative
announcement returns, the model predicts a negative correlation between the pre-announcement
price run-up and announcement returns.
Bargaining power and social e¢ ciency
Our work shows that an acquisition is not always initiated at a level that maximizes the
overall surplus to society. This is in contrast to Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004), who ￿nd that
in a competitive industry mergers are not just privately, but also socially e¢ cient.
In the case of high integration cost or low value added, the greater the seller￿ s bargaining
power, the lower the acquisition threshold and the lower the surplus generated by the acquisition.
Hence, policies that limit the bargaining power of a seller may be bene￿cial to society; they help
the buyer choose the socially optimal timing of the acquisition. The greater bargaining power
in the hands of the seller can force the acquirer to start the acquisition too soon, as a way of
protecting its outside option. This destroys social surplus. Consequently, from a social welfare
34view, policies that restrict the use of poison pills should yield more socially e¢ cient outcomes.
6 Conclusion
We compare a ￿rm￿ s opportunity to grow internally with the option of expanding via acquisitions.
The advantage of an acquisition over internal investment is quicker access to cash ￿ ows. The
disadvantage is, in general, a higher cost in the price paid for the acquired business, plus any
integration expenses.
When there is signi￿cant cost to integrate an acquired business, we show that the opportunity
to achieve growth via internal investment in￿ uences the acquisition strategy. This is because the
value of internal growth gives the ￿rm another option in bargaining with the seller. The value of
this option is constant up to a certain value of the asset to be acquired, but declines above that
value.
When a relatively high acquisition cost leads to a high acquisition threshold, the declining
value of the outside option reduces this threshold to a lower asset value. This makes acquisitions
occurring sooner than if there were no internal growth opportunities.
For a wide range of parameters, acquisitions occur earlier, the longer the time between initiat-
ing and completing internal growth. This implies negative stock price reactions to buyer-initiated
acquisition announcements, and price run-ups prior to acquisitions when investors are imper-
fectly informed about the pro￿tability of internal investment. Seller-initiated acquisitions lead to
negative stock price movements when the seller has considerable bargaining power.
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Proof of Equation (2)




￿2V 2fV V (V ) + (r ￿ ￿)V fV (V ) ￿ rf(V ) = 0, (A-1)
The general solution of the ODE (A-1) is
f(V ) = X1V ￿ + X2V ￿
0
, (A-2)
where X1 and X2 are constants to be determined, and ￿ > 1, and ￿
0




￿2x(x ￿ 1) + (r ￿ ￿)x ￿ r = 0. (A-3)
To solve for the value function vA(V ) for an arbitrary value of V A
G , we use the boundary
conditions:14
vA(0) = 0 (A-4)
vA(V A
G ) = (V A





(A-4) implies that X2 = 0, or the value function will reach 1, when V approaches 0. Notice
14 For simplicity, we suppress the dependence of v
A(V ) on V
A
G and write v




36that there is no smooth-pasting condition since the investment rule is arbitrarily given by V A
G .













Proof of Equation (6)
The target ￿rm￿ s value function, s(V ), for an arbitrary value of V A
G can be thought of as the
current asset value plus an option to obtain pA(V A
G ) in exchange of aV A
G , i.e., s(V ) = aV +e(V ),
where e(V ) is an option to obtain pA(V A
G ) with the cost aV A
G . We need to ￿nd the value function
for the option e(V ), which satis￿es (A-1), but has di⁄erent boundary conditions:
e(0) = 0 (A-7)
e(V A
G ) = pA(V A
G ) ￿ aV A
G . (A-8)
Again there is no smooth-pasting condition since the seller does not choose optimal V A
G : (A-7)
implies that the coe¢ cient X2 = 0: Using (A-8) to solve for X1 in the general solution gives
e(V ) = (pA(V A








s(V ) = aV + (pA(V A








37Proof of Lemma 1
To obtain the value function vO(V ); we start by solving the value of the second-stage investment,
vO0(V ), which must satisfy the boundary conditions:
vO0(0) = 0 (A-10)
vO0(￿V ) = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿V ￿ k) . (A-11)
(A-10) implies that X2 = 0; and there is no smooth-pasting condition in this stage since the
investment rule is already speci￿ed by ￿. We then solve for the coe¢ cient X1 and obtain






Recall that the investment in the ￿rst stage gives the ￿rm ￿ of V and access to the second-
stage investment, vO0(V ). The value function of the ￿rst-stage investment, vO(V ), must satisfy
the boundary and smooth-pasting conditions:
vO(0) = 0 (A-13)
vO(V O￿
G ) = ￿(V O￿













= ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿￿. (A-15)
As before, X2 = 0; and we are left with two unknown variables, X1 and V O￿
G , and two equa-


































￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
kO: (A-17)
Proof of Corollary 1
To see that V O￿
G is not a monotonic function of ￿ and that there is a unique ￿￿ such that for
￿ > ￿￿, V O￿



















￿ (1 ￿ ￿) . (A-19)
Because ￿ > 1, ￿ > 1, and ￿ < 1; the numerator of (A-18) can be positive or negative,
depending on x(￿). Next, we will show there is a unique ￿￿ such that for values of ￿ < ￿￿,
x(￿￿) < 0, and
@V O￿
G




Di⁄erentiating x(￿) with respect to ￿ gives
@x(￿)
@￿
= ￿￿2+￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) > 0 , (A-20)
39which means that x(￿) is increasing in ￿:
Evaluating x(￿) at ￿ = 1; and ￿ ! 1 gives x(1) = ￿1, and x(1) = +1: We therefore
conclude that there is ￿￿ such that x(￿￿) = 0; and
@V O￿
G








Next, to see that vO￿(V ) declines with ￿, di⁄erentiate vO￿(V ) with respect to ￿:
@vO￿(V )
@￿
= (￿ ￿ 1)￿
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + (￿￿￿1 ￿ 1)￿)￿￿1
￿￿￿2(1 + (￿￿ ￿ 1)￿)￿
(￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿￿￿1 V ￿(kO)1￿￿ < 0. (A-21)
Proof of Proposition 1
At the point of an acquisition V = V A
G , the Nash formula yields
pA(V A




G ￿ F ￿ dA(V A




Now we need to determine the value dS(V A
G ) and dA(V A
G ) explicitly. First:
dS(V A
G ) = aV A
G (A-23)
by the assumption that if the asset stays with the seller, it is worth aV A









G ) is de￿ned in (8). In order to ￿nd V A￿
G , we need to take two cases: V A￿
G ￿ V O￿
G ,
and V A￿
G > V O￿
G .
40If V A￿
G is lower than V O￿
G ; which means that it is optimal to start the acquisition before it
is optimal to start the internal growth, then at the point of acquisition negotiation, the value of
the internal growth, vO￿(V A
G ), is still at the maximum; i.e., vO￿(V A

















, and the buyer can walk away from the negotiation, and is still able
to exercise the internal growth option optimally later.
However, if the optimal V A￿
G is higher than V O￿
G ; which means that the acquisition occurs
after it is optimal to start the internal growth, then at the point of the negotiation, the internal
growth has already started to lose its value. If the negotiation breaks down, it is optimal for the
buyer to start the internal growth right away. Hence
vO￿(V A
G ) = ￿(V A







As a result, pA(V A
G ) is also separated into two cases: V A￿
G > V O￿
G and V A￿
G ￿ V O￿
G . To ￿nd
the optimal V A
G , in each case we plug pA(V A
G ), into (2), and obtain
pA(V A￿




G ￿ F ￿ vO￿(V A￿




Then di⁄erentiate the above equation with respect to V A
G . Solving the ￿rst-order condition
yields the results as follows:
For V A￿
G < V O￿















￿(￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO + (1 ￿ ￿)F
￿(￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)
. (A-28)
It can be veri￿ed that the second derivative of equation (2) with respect to V A
G is negative,
guaranteeing that vA obtains its maximum value at V A￿
G :
Finally, by comparing V A￿
G and V O￿
G , we conclude that V A￿
G < V O￿
G , if and only if F
1￿a <
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, and V A￿
G ￿ V O￿
G , if and only if F
1￿a ￿
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, so the two ratios, F
1￿a and
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, separate the two scenarios.
Proof that @V A￿









￿￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)+(1￿￿)(1￿a), di⁄erentiate V A￿







(1 ￿ a)(￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO ￿ F(￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))









￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO. Hence, V A￿
G declines with ￿.
Proof of Proposition 2
The buyer and the seller will agree to negotiate only when the surplus is non-negative. The
surplus is zero is when the seller has all the bargaining power, i.e., ￿ = 1: In such case, the buyer
requires the level of synergies that make the value of an acquisition equal to the value of internal
growth.
42In order to identify the minimum level of synergies required for an acquisition, ￿rst recognize
that when ￿ = 1; V A￿
G = V O￿
G . Next, from (5), the surplus is positive only when V O￿
G ￿ F ￿
dA(V O￿
G )￿dS(V O￿
G ) ￿ 0: Next, substitute aV O￿
G for dS(V O￿









G ), then, solve for A ￿ 1 ￿ a.





(F(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (￿ + ￿ ￿ 1)kOC)2 ￿ 0; (A-30)
where C = ￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0, and D = ￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0.
To see that, for a su¢ ciently low F, A declines with ￿, it su¢ ces to show that @A
@￿ ￿ 0. First,




(C￿F(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ DF￿ + C2￿kO)￿￿1￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿kO(1 ￿ ￿)
C2￿kO : (A-31)
The sign of @A
@￿ depends on that of the numerator, which is linear in F, and is negative when
F ￿
C2￿kO
D￿+C￿(￿￿1): So if F is not too large, @A
@￿ ￿ 0:










It can be veri￿ed that
@￿(￿)










@￿ depends on that of the numerator, which is linear in F, and is negative
when F ￿
C2kO(￿￿D￿￿￿(t￿1)log(￿))
￿￿CD+(￿C￿D)(￿￿1)￿(t￿1)log(￿): So if F is not too large, @A
@￿ ￿ 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
First, consider the early acquisition case. Equation (12) immediately reveals that V A￿
G does not
depend on ￿. To see that vA(V ) declines with ￿, substitute (11) and (12) into (2) and di⁄erentiate
vA￿(V ) with respect to ￿ :
@vA￿(V )
@￿


















￿(1 + (￿￿ ￿ 1)￿)
￿￿
￿ 0 . (A-34)
Next, consider the late acquisition case. To see that there is a unique ￿￿ such that for ￿ > ￿￿,
V A￿
G increases with ￿, and for ￿ < ￿￿ declines with ￿, di⁄erentiate V A￿










￿￿ ￿ F(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) +
kO￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + kO(1 ￿ a)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ a ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)￿)))
￿
(A-36)
Since 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1;
@V A￿
G
@￿ can be positive or negative, depending on y(￿). Di⁄erentiating y(￿)
44with respect to ￿ gives
@y(￿)
@￿
= kO￿￿2￿￿￿(￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿((1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿)) ￿ 0 . (A-37)
Evaluating y(￿) at ￿ = 1 gives
y(￿)j￿=1 = kO((1 ￿ a)￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿) ￿ F(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ kO((1 ￿ a)￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿) ￿ kO(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
= kO((1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ 1) < 0 , (A-38)
where the inequality follows because for ￿ = 1, F ￿ (1 ￿ a)kO. Next, when ￿ ! 1, we have
y(￿)j￿!1 = F(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿) + kO￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 0 . (A-39)
From (A-33)-(A-35), we conclude there is a unique ￿￿ such that y(￿) = 0, and
@V A￿
G
@￿ = 0. For
any ￿ < ￿￿, we have y(￿) < 0, and
@V A￿
G




To see that vA￿(V ) declines with ￿, substitute (11) and (12) into (2) and di⁄erentiate vA￿(V )
with respect to ￿:
@vA￿(V )
@￿
= (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿￿((￿ ￿ 1)V )
￿




F￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ kO(1 ￿ a ￿ ￿ + a￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
(￿￿(1 + a(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿) + ￿(￿(1 ￿ ￿))1￿￿
￿
. (A-40)
The ￿rst term is negative, and the second term is always positive. The sign of
@vA￿(V )
@￿ thus
45depends on the sign of the third term. Because F
1￿a ￿
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, it can be veri￿ed that
￿
F￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ kO(1 ￿ a ￿ ￿ + a￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿






Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that b vA0
￿ = b vA
￿ , when F
1￿a <
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, recognize that since V A￿
G is not a function of
￿, b vA0
￿ = b vA
￿ = Et[vA￿(V A￿
G )], the unconditional expectation of vA￿(V A￿
G ), and the announcement









G = V A￿
G (￿). For the proof, we write vA￿(￿) to
explicitly show the dependence of vA￿(:) on ￿, and suppress the dependence of vA￿(:) on V . Then:
b vA0
￿ = E[vA￿(￿)jV A￿
G (￿) > V m￿]































46The inequality in the ￿fth line follows because vA￿(:) declines monotonically with ￿ so
vA￿(￿) > vA￿[G￿1(V m￿)] for all ￿ < G￿1(V m￿). Also, we use the fact that V m￿ = V A￿
G (￿)
and G￿1(V A￿
G (￿)) = ￿# in the equality in the sixth line.
Proof of Proposition 5
To show that b vA
t2 ￿ b vA
t1, we ￿rst show that E[vA￿(V )j￿ < X] declines with X. Again, we write
vA￿(￿) to explicitly show the dependence of vA￿(:) on ￿. Next, di⁄erentiate E[vA￿(￿)j￿ < X]
with respect to X:
@
@X































= 0 . (A-43)
We use Leibniz￿ s rule in the equality in the second line and the fact that vA￿(￿) > vA￿(X)
47for all ￿ < X in the inequality in third line. Next, write
b vA
t2 = E[vA￿(￿)jV A￿
G (￿) > V mt2]
= E[vA￿(￿)j￿ < G￿1(V mt2)]
￿ E[vA￿(￿)j￿ < G￿1(V mt1)]
= E[vA￿(￿)jV A￿
G (￿) > V mt1]
= b vA
t1 . (A-44)
The inequality follows because when V mt2 ￿ V mt1, G￿1(V mt2) ￿ G￿1(V mt1) and E[vA￿(￿)j￿ <
X] declines with X.When V mt2 > V mt1, and G￿1(V mt2) < G￿1(V mt1),the inequality is strict.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let V S￿
G denote the threshold that maximizes the seller￿ s utility. The solutions for V S￿
G are divided











for V < V S
G into (6), and V S
G for V A
G , and









It can be veri￿ed that the second derivative is negative, so V S￿
G maximizes s(V ). Next, we
will verify that the seller has no incentive to wait beyond V S￿
G , i.e., it will not choose V S
G >
48V O￿
G = V A￿




for V ￿ V S






F ￿ (￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO
(1 ￿ a) ￿ (￿ + ￿1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))
. (A-46)
The second derivative of s(V ) with respect to V S




￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO and a 2 [0;1], it follows that F < (￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO. This implies
that the second derivative is positive, and V S￿
G minimizes s(V ). Therefore, the seller will choose
V S









for V = V S
G into (6), and V S
G for V A
G , and
solving the ￿rst-order condition for V S￿
G yields the same result as shown in (A-46). However,
in this case the second derivative of (6)is negative when F > (￿ + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))kO. Thus, V S￿
G
maximizes s(V ).





(1￿a), the surplus maximizing acquisition threshold. In the ￿rst
regime, the result is immediate since V S￿





(1￿a). In the second regime, the inequality
is true if and only if F
1￿a ￿
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, the condition of the present regime. Because V S￿
G max-





(1￿a), the seller￿ s utility increases strictly monotonically
in the acquisition threshold until at least the surplus maximizing acquisition threshold.
Proof of Proposition 6
The relative values of F
1￿a and
￿+￿￿￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO determine the acquisition strategies of the buyer





￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, the buyer￿ s and the seller￿ s threshold are the same. So the




￿+￿1￿￿(1￿￿)kO, by Lemma 2, the seller has no incentive to start negotiations at




1￿a has passed because its utility increases at least
until that point. As we argue in Section 2.7, the buyer￿ s optimal acquisition threshold, V A￿
G , is
lower than the socially e¢ cient threshold, so the buyer will initiate the transaction.
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Initial asset value, V: 1
Total internal investment, k
0:1
Fixed Integration cost, F: 0.85
First-stage investment, θ: 0.5
Second-stage delay, β: 1.5
Figure I:  The Values of Acquisition and Internal Growth
Figure I shows the value of the acquisition, v
A, and the value of the internal growth, v
O, for different values 
of ρ under the late acquisition regime. A higher ρ indicates lower bargaining power of the acquirer. The 
black squares indicate the optimal levels of acqusition thresholds. The parameters are identified in Table I.
 (Late Acquisition Regime)
Table I: Base Case Parameters
Unless noted, the following parameter configuration is 









2.20 2.40 2.60 2.80 3.00 3.20
$
ρ = 0.00
ρ  = 0.25
ρ  = 0.50







acquisition thresholdFigure II: Effects of a Delay on the Second-Stage Investment




Panel A: Optimal Acquisition Threshold,
Panel B: Endogenous Acquisition Price, p
A
Panel C: Acquisition Value, v
A, and Seller's Profits, s
Panel A shows       as a function of β; Panel B shows p
A as a function of β; Panel C shows the acquisition 
value, v
A (solid line), and the seller's wealth, s (dashed line), as functions of β. The seller is assumed to 
have all bargaining power, i.e., ρ = 1, and the acquisition occurs relatively late (the late acquisition regime). 






































Panel A: V vs V
mt Panel B: E[β]
t t
Panel A shows evolution of the value of the underlying asset, V (solid line), and the maximum value of V up to time t, V
mt (dashed line). Panel 
B shows the expected value of β
# that corresponds to V
mt.  Panel C shows investors’ expected value of an acquisition, E[v
A] (solid line), and 
the value of an acquisition when the true value of β
# is known, v
A (dashed line). Panel D plots the difference between the expected acquisition 
value, E[v
A], and the acquisition value if β
#  is known, v
A. The distribution of β
# is assumed to be uniform over [1, 4], and the true β
# is 1.5, 
The initial asset value V is 2.5 and ρ = 1. The other parameters are identified in Table I.
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